

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGL-A 9349

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CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 JUN. 1954

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Observations: ~~General Heusinger During Visit to Venice, Italy~~

1. General and Mrs. Heusinger spent one week vacationing in Italy with [ ] and his wife, between 22 and 30 May 1954.

2. Although no special effort was made to discuss business with Heusinger he made a number of statements and voiced some opinions that appear worthy of recording and are rendered without comment as follows:

a. ZIPPER.

(1) There is excellent rapport between USANCE and Utility. USANCE has declared his willingness to cooperate and assist Utility in any manner he can to bring about a solution towards the legalization of ZIPPER.

(2) During a meeting between Utility and USANCE on 24 May 1954 in discussing the future of ZIPPER it was resolved that ZIPPER chances for legalization can best be accomplished under a German National Security Council type organization which must be established under the Federal Republic Executive. Utility and USANCE reportedly rejected legalization under either the Chancellory, the Defense Ministry or any other Ministry.

b. German National Security Council.

(1) The creation of a German NSC patterned after our own has been given serious consideration by many Germans. USANCE, Utility and Heusinger are much in favor.

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(2) Heusinger is of the opinion that such a security council can be established by the Chancellor at this time without reference to ratification of the treaties, provided the Chancellor takes the initiative which must then be followed up by US endorsement.

(3) Heusinger believes that a member of the SPD must be included in such a council if it is to be successful. However since there are no SPD members within the executive, Heusinger believes that ERLER as head of the Parliamentary Committee for EDC in the Bundestag would be a logical choice. He visualizes the council to be composed of the following members:

Chancellor  
Vice Chancellor  
Minister of Defense  
Minister of Economics  
Minister of Finance  
Parliamentary Chairman, EDC

c. EDC

(1) Heusinger presented an extremely pessimistic view. He does not believe that EDC can still be considered a solution for German defense contribution. He claimed that French procrastination and delay has broken the spirit and moral goodwill in Western Germany.

(2) During a recent discussion of EDC problems between Ollenhauer and Heusinger, Ollenhauer reportedly stated there is no sense in giving further consideration to EDC, for even if there is French ratification, it will be by such a small majority that it will emphasize to Europe and specifically the French High Command that there is little spirit or enthusiasm behind this act. Thus an unfavorable situation will be created at the outset.

(3) Heusinger stated he and Speidel have recently been ridiculed by many officers who are smugly stating "I told you so". Originally this was a small group of officers who were basically opposed to EDC. However, many more former officers have been cynical of late.

(4) Both Speidel and Heusinger at one time considered simultaneously resigning their positions, which if carried out, Heusinger claims, would have resulted in a complete collapse of German Planning within EDC. Heusinger said if he and Speidel were to state the reason for their resignation as - failure to accomplish contingent planning due to French obstruction and their resultant belief that it is senseless to continue - there is no other qualified German General who could or would take over their tasks.

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(5) Heusinger believes that it is good propaganda to declare that NATO has made tremendous strides in its effectiveness. However, he stated that in his opinion truly little progress has been made with two exceptions: 1) The US Air superiority and effectiveness and 2) the US Atom and Hydrogen Bomb developments.

(6) Heusinger stated he has repeatedly conferred with General Gruenther in Paris and expressed his views but feels that General Gruenther is unrealistically optimistic, and Heusinger has been informed that though General Gruenther agrees with him the situation may still be resolved by patience and perseverance.

d. ALTERNATE SOLUTION.

(1) Heusinger is of the opinion that in order to solve the present impasse effecting German re-militarization it is necessary for the United States and Britain to jointly declare that these Governments will effect the creation of German contingents for EDC at this time by activating ten of the twelve divisions which are to be located in the US and British Zones of Germany. Heusinger guarantees that if this were to happen ~~that~~ France would immediately follow suit and come to an agreement.

(2) Heusinger also proposed as a solution that the British/US formally reject the EDC treaty concept as unworkable and unsuccessful since no progress has been made in two years; and jointly declare the immediate establishment of German Divisions on a bi-Zonal basis (British/US Zones of Germany). This action would result in German National forces which would have to be subordinate to SHAPE within NATO. Again Heusinger feels that were such a step taken France would feel obliged to join.

(3) A third possibility is the rejection of the EDC agreement and a return to the plans for German National re-militarization in accordance with the Petersberg Agreement.

e. United States Foreign Policy.

(1) Heusinger stated that he is firmly in favor of and committed to the John Foster Dulles concept that Soviet strategy has not changed; that present Soviet softening tactics can abruptly change; and the policy that it is necessary to be fully prepared for this eventuality. However, Heusinger feels that more and more Europeans are drifting away from that concept and are coming to the conclusion that Soviet strategy is indeed changing; that no international crisis is to be expected; and peaceful co-existence is truly being offered.

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(2) Heusinger is of the opinion that the US is too good-willed towards its European Allies and therefore the allies will exert their own foreign political aims as they choose though they be at variance with US policy. He repeatedly stressed the US must be firmer in dealing with its allies.

## f. German-Soviet Relations.

(1) Heusinger has deplored some of the press editorials dealing with Pfleiderer's plan to negotiate with the Soviets. He claims that an erroneous impression has been created in that most German politicians are not in favor of such a plan. He branded Pfleiderer as a radical who is not really an FDP representative (he was an independent who had to join a political party in order to hold office).

(2) Heusinger feels that there is some German sentiment in favor of such a plan, which however is due only to the present perplexity that exists in West Germany. He stated that the average German's belief is that the western powers, confronted with many major problems, are not interested or able to resolve Germany's problems of reunification, sovereignty, etc; and in their confusion believe they must help themselves.

(3) The Chancellor's foreign political platform is committed to the US foreign policy. However, according to Heusinger the Chancellor is growing increasingly weary of defending his position and gaining the feeling at the same time that it will not be successful.

## 3. Turner P. Harrison Comment:

a. As stated at the beginning of this dispatch the statements and reflections by Heusinger are his without comment. (C) briefed Heusinger on the KUBARK/NSC function and structure similar to (C) briefing to Causa. Although Heusinger had previously been briefed in part (C) briefing) he was thoroughly impressed.

b. As a general comment to Heusinger's statements we can only submit our impression that Heusinger is not as politically astute as we had previously considered him to be. We have on past occasion noted that Heusinger has made strong statements pertaining to political situations in which he has reversed himself within a period of several weeks.

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He obviously was in a tired and depressed mood and caught in somewhat the same perplexing frame of mind he described as the average German's.

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